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INTRODUCTION

Dealing with catastrophic outbreaks of communicable disease
will likely be one of the greatest challenges facing state and federal
governments in the United States in the twenty-first century. In the
last fifteen years, policymakers have become increasingly sensitive
to the prospect of bioterrorism acts involving contagious diseases
and the threat of rapid international transmission of diseases rang* Roni A. Elias, continues his work In Re BCCI in which he has assisted in the return of
over $9 Billion to the depositors J.D. FAMU, College of Law & B.S. NSU. I am so blessed &
greatly appreciate the love of my life, M.G.S., for her love and making me smile every minute
of every day. To Dr.'s Aida & Adil Elias, my first great teachers in life, I thank you and
appreciate more than words can ever say. I am truly grateful to the best brother anyone could
be blessed to have, my brother, Pierre A. Elias. To the Charlotte Law Review, for their nonstop attention to detail I appreciate and thank. I thank Professor LeRoy Pernell for his
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ing from influenza to Ebola. The danger to public health posed by
disease outbreak-and the danger to social order that would follow
a disease outbreak-make it clear that any risk of a rapidly spreading, communicable disease would have to be met with swift and decisive measures by officials at every level of government. The use
of isolation and quarantine would be among the most powerful instruments government officials would have to control the spread of
disease and protect the public.
Although the government's use of quarantine has a long history
in the United States, the legal instruments for imposing quarantine
are not especially well-developed, and there are serious reasons to
question whether governments at the local, state, or federal level in
the United States are adequately prepared to effectively use quarantine and isolation to stop the spread of disease. To a significant
extent, the problems with the effective use of quarantine stem from
the legal structure under which the authority to impose quarantine
and isolation is exercised. Officials at allleve1s of government have
extensive power to issue quarantine and isolation orders, but there
are two principal problems with how those powers may be used.
First, few formal structures exist to assure coordinated action
among officials at different levels of government. Recent events
have demonstrated that officials in different places-and therefore
subject to different political dynamics-are likely to view possible
disease outbreaks in profoundly different ways and therefore undertake profoundly different responses. Without an established
framework designed to assure a degree of coordination among officials at various levels of government, there is a risk that the governments' collective response to disease outbreaks will be piecemeal
and inconsistent-just the opposite of what is needed to control
outbreaks and reassure the public that the risks to its health are
being addressed.
Second, regardless of whether public health powers and policy
are effectively coordinated on a national level, the law establishing
authority for public officials is often ill-defined. In many jurisdictions, public health law gives officials ready opportunities to abuse
individual civil rights in the name of the public good. Moreover,
the combination of ill-defined official powers and a lack of coordination in policymaking often makes the execution of public health
law ineffective.
This Article examines the existing local, state, and federal law
that authorizes quarantines and isolations and considers these laws
in the context of public health policy and recent events. This Arti-
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cle also focuses on two recent cases involving the exercise of quarantine authority to illustrate the problems with existing law.
Finally, this Article considers proposals for quarantine and isolation
law reform at the state level and evaluates the ability of these proposals to solve the problems with existing law. This Article concludes that the most effective reform measure is to give federal
public health agencies primary jurisdiction over the control of the
diseases within their authority, with the power to delegate disease
control tasks to state agencies. Such an allocation of jurisdiction
assures greater coordination in the making and execution of public
health policy regarding disease outbreaks, and it is the best way to
cure the primary existing problems in the law governing quarantine
and isolation.
I.

THE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO ORDER
QUARANTINES AND ISOLATION

Federal, state, and local governments all have the authority to
order quarantines and isolation as an aspect of their general police
power. 1 If and when a government agency issues a quarantine order, it implicates the liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," Any judicial
review of an individual's challenge to the legality of a quarantine
order will necessarily involve assessing the balance of the government's legitimate interests in protecting the health and safety of the
public with the individual's constitutionally protected interest in
avoiding arbitrary and capricious exercises of government police
power. 3
In general, especially in matters relating to public health and the
control of disease, courts are inclined to defer to the government's
definition of the public's interest and its assertion of the means necessary to protect that interest. For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court upheld the authority of
state and local government agencies to impose a mandatory vaccination program in response to the threat of a disease outbreak.' As
an initial matter, the Court asserted a general principle: "[T[he lib1. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (discussing the scope of the government's police power in public health matters and the constitutional limits on that power).
2. See id.
3. See id. However, in 1902 the Court considered a challenge to the legality of a quarantine order issued by a state agency, and this challenge turned on the Commerce Clause, not
the principles of due process. Compaigne Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Board of
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902).
4. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
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erty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint."5 On the basis of this principle, the Court concluded the
vaccination program represented a reasonable incursion on individual liberty by a duly authorized government agency.
The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in
such an emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in
some body; and surely it was appropriate for the legislature
to refer that question, in the first instance, to a board of
health composed of persons residing in the locality affected,
and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such questions. To invest such a body with authority
over such matters was not an unusual, nor an unreasonable
or arbitrary, requirement."

In this analysis, the Court demonstrates it is willing to defer to
state and local authority in two important respects: (1) the identification of the agency empowered to make decisions about what is
necessary to protect public health; and (2) the substance of the decisions made by that agency. In other words, the Court did not, to
use a contemporary phrase, "micromanage" the agency's decisionmaking. Instead, its inquiry essentially began and ended with the
question of whether the agency's action could be deemed reasonable. If so, the Court was content to leave it alone.
In the century since Jacobson, courts have followed its deferential example. In Miller v. Campbell County, the Tenth Circuit considered whether a local agency exceeded the constitutional limits on
its authority by ordering the evacuation of a residential area in response to a gas leak.? By affirming the legality of the evacuation
order and the arrest of the person who violated that order, the
Tenth Circuit concluded there was no violation of due process principles, as long as the officials acted in good faith,"
Similarly, in United States v. Shinnick, a district court upheld the
Public Health Service's ("PHS") decision to keep an individual in
medical isolation based on the showing that the PHS acted in good
faith.? The district court did not undertake any specific inquiry
about whether the agency's decision was well-grounded in fact; it
5. Jd. at 26.
6. Jd. at 27.

7. Miller v. Campbell Cty., 945 F.2d 348,351 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. Jd. at 354.
9. United States v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789,791 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
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was enough for the court that the decision had a facially reasonable
foundation in fact. IO Other cases involving similar constitutional
challenges to quarantine orders have demonstrated a similar degree
of judicial deference.'!
There is some precedent under which a court could justify undertaking more than a facial inquiry into the reasonableness of a
public health order seeking to control the spread of disease, but this
authority is not especially powerful nor is it likely to be particularly
relevant in contemporary challenges to quarantine orders. In 1900,
city officials in San Francisco concluded nine persons in a primarily
Chinese neighborhood were infected with bubonic plague.t- In response, the public health officials issued a quarantine order that applied only to Chinese residents, which prevented them from leaving
the city, and also ordered the inoculation of all Chinese residents.P
When these orders were challenged, the court concluded the public
officials violated constitutional principles of equal protection for
two reasons: (1) because the orders reflected discrimination on the
basis of ethnic origin; and (2) because the scope of the orders was
not reasonably related to the control of the risk presented by the
diagnosed cases.!" Despite the court's receptiveness to the constitutional challenge, it is not clear whether this case is effective authority to justify higher judicial scrutiny in government public health
decisions. Indeed, although the court did not specifically refer to
bad faith on the part of San Francisco public health officials, it
seems clear that the court concluded that the city's action involved
something besides a good-faith effort to control a public health
crisis.
II.

THE LAW GOVERNING THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER
QUARANTINES AND ISOLATION

At all levels of government in the United States, quarantine and
isolation orders are the product of authority created by statutes and
regulations. For the most part, legislatures have enacted statutes
creating broad authority for specified agencies to take any measures reasonably necessary to control the spread of communicable
10. Jd.

11. JARED P. COLE, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION AUTHORITY 7-10 (Oct. 9,2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesedRL33201.pdf.
12. See Jew Ho V. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 12 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
13. See id. at 13.
14. Jd. at 26.

140

Charlotte Law Review

[Vol. 7:135

diseases.l" Those agencies are generally given policy and rule-making authority along with enforcement power.!" Consequently, the
issuance of orders for quarantines and isolation is entirely an aspect
of administrative law.
A.

Federal Quarantine Law

The federal power to impose quarantines and issue isolation orders comes from the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the
authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States].]"!? Pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power, Congress enacted the Public Health Service Act
("PHSA").18 Section 264 of the PHSA grants the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("the Secretary") the authority to
make and enforce regulations necessary "to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign
countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession."19 To this end, the law
also gives the Secretary expansive authority to apprehend, detain,
or conditionally release a person in connection with the authority to
control the transmission and spread of communicable diseases.v
The PHSA establishes significant limits on the Secretary's ability to exercise this authority. It provides that the Secretary may use
this regulatory and enforcement authority only with respect to communicable diseases identified by executive order.>' The executive
order currently in place gives the Secretary authority to deal with
the following diseases: cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis,
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers (including
Ebola), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and influenza
viruses, which all have the potential to cause a pandemic.F In 2000,
the Secretary transferred his statutory authority to order quarantines to the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 241 (2012); see also Cole, supra note 11, at 1-7 (discussing federal
and state law pertaining to quarantine).
16. See Cole, supra note 11, at 1-7 (discussing federal and state law pertaining to
quarantine).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 201; see also Cole, supra note 11, at 1-7 (discussing federal and state law
pertaining to quarantine).
19. 42 U.S.c. § 264(a). According to § 271, violation of federal quarantine and isolation
regulations is a criminal misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
20. [d. § 264(b).
21. [d.
22. Exec. Order No. 13295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003) (amended luI. 31, 2014).
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vention ("CDC").23 After this transfer, the CDC now has control
over both interstate and foreign quarantine measures through its
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine.>'
Under the PHSA, there is broad authority to deprive a person
of liberty in connection with a quarantine order. Section 264 of the
PHSA authorizes the apprehension and examination of "any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage" under two conditions: if the person is
reasonably believed (1) "to be moving or about to move from a
State to another State;" or (2) "to be a probable source of infection
to individuals who, while infected with such disease in a qualifying
stage, will be moving from a State to another State."25 The statutory term "qualifying stage" is defined as a disease (1) "in a communicable stage;" or (2) "in a precommunicable stage, if the disease
would be likely to cause a public health emergency if transmitted to
other individuals."26 During wartime, this detention authority extends even further, reaching any individual "reasonably believed
(1) to be infected with such disease [as specified in an Executive
Order of the President] and (2) to be a probable source of infection
to members of the armed forces of the United States or to individuals engaged in the production or transportation of ... supplies for
the armed forces. "27
There are some important limitations on this authority. In general, the regulations governing the apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional release of individuals apply "only to
individuals coming into a State or possession from a foreign country
or a possession."28 The Secretary has promulgated regulations to
improve the CDC's capacity to identify persons who might be subject to quarantine orders as they enter the country. These regulations require airline pilots and ship captains to immediately report
the presence of ill passengers on board their vessels.w In addition,
pilots of both interstate flights within the U.S. and international
flights that arrive in the U.S. are required to report any instances of
23. 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.2-70.8 (2015). Regulations regarding quarantine upon entry into the
United States from foreign countries are also administered by the CDC, which are contained
in 42 C.F.R. § 71.
24. See, e.g., Quarantine and Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncpdcid/dgmq/index.html(last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
25. 42 U.S.c. § 264(d)(1).
26. Id. § 264(d)(2).
27. Id. § 266.
28. Id. § 264(c).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 71.21(a)-(b) (2015).
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the illnesses identified in the Executive Order before the flight
Iands.v These reports must be directed to the CDC-operated
"quarantine station" closest to the destination airport." There are
currently twenty such stations in the United States.P
Upon receiving such a report, if the CDC finds that a person is
infected, he or she may be detained.P Because the CDC does not
have its own officials at each port of entry, various agencies in the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") are authorized to assist the CDC in "the enforcement of quarantine rules and
regulations[.] "34
The regulations governing federal quarantine orders contemplate a degree of cooperation between state, local, and federal officials. In addition to having original regulatory authority to issue
quarantine orders, the CDC also has authority to supervise the actions of state and local officials in connection with the risk of the
interstate transmission of communicable diseases.> Thus, the Director of the CDC also has authority to take any measures as may
be necessary to prevent the spread of a communicable disease from
one "[s]tate or possession to any other [s]tate or possession," if the
Director determines state or local health officials have failed to
take adequate measures of their own.> To prevent the spread of
diseases betweerr states, the regulations prohibit infected persons
from traveling from one state to another "without a permit from
the health officer of the [s]tate, possession, or locality of destination, if such permit is required under the law applicable to the place
of destination."3? Additional requirements apply to persons who
are in the "communicable period of cholera, plague, smallpox, typhus or yellow fever, or who, having been exposed to any such disease, [are] in the incubation period thereof[.]"38
Section 243 of the PHSA provides for federal-state cooperative
activities to enforce quarantines." The federal government may assist states and localities in enforcing their quarantines and other
health regulations and, in turn, may accept state and local assistance
30. Id. §§ 70.4, 71.21(b).
31. Id. § 71.21(a)-(b)..
32. Quarantine and Isolation, supra note 24.
33. 42 C.P.R. § 71.32.
34. 42 U.S.c. § 268 (2012).
35. 42 c.P.R. § 70.2.
36.ld.
37. Id. § 70.3.
38. Id. § 70.5.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 243.
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in enforcing federal quarantines." In addition, the Secretary may
request the aid of the Coast Guard and military officers in the execution of quarantines imposed by states on vessels coming into
ports." Section 249 of the PHS A authorizes the PHS to care for
and treat persons under quarantine.v When necessary, the PHS
can contribute to the cost of enforcing quarantine orders, whether
such orders are issued by state or federal officials, meaning the PHS
may pay for treatment at public or private medical facilities pursuant to an authorizing order from the appropriate local PHS
officer.s>

State, local, and federal officials all have access to certain legal
instruments to impose travel restrictions in the name of controlling
the spread of communicable diseases. The CDC and DHS have recently allowed the creation of a "Do Not Board" ("DNB") list,
through which domestic and international health officials request
that persons with communicable diseases be restricted from boarding commercial aircraft departing from or arriving in the United
States when such persons meet specific criteria and pose a serious
threat to the public.v' A state or local official can place a person on
the DNB list by contacting the local CDC Quarantine Station.:"
The CDC then determines if the person is: (1) likely contagious
with a communicable disease that presents a serious public health
threat; (2) unaware of or likely not to comply with public health
recommendations and medical treatment; and (3) likely to try
boarding a commercial aircraft." The DNB list applies only to air
travel.s? There are no equivalent regulations for forms of ground
transportation such as buses or trains.

40. ld.
41. ld. § 97.
42. ld. § 249(a).

43. ld. § 249(c).

44. See 14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2015) (authorizing airlines to refuse to board passengers with
communicable diseases under specified circumstances); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTAIllLlTY OFF.,
GAO-09-58, PUBLIC HEALTH AND BORDER SECURITY: HHS ANI> DHS SHOULI> FURTHER
STRENGTHEN THEIR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO TB INCIDENTS 28 (Oct., 2008).
45. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public
Health Purposes -- United States, June 2007- May 2008, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REI'. (Sep. 19, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm?s_cid=
mm5737al_e.

46.ld.
47.ld.
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State Quarantine Law

Because federal authority regarding quarantines is limited by
the scope of an Executive Order, state and local officials are often
at the forefront of efforts to control disease by using their authority
to order quarantines or isolation. Accordingly, the CDC has asserted a policy of deferring to state authority. As the CDC has
explained:
In general, CDC defers to the state and local health authorities in their primary use of their own separate quarantine
powers. Based upon long experience and collaborative
working relationships with our state and local partners, CDC
continues to anticipate the need to use this federal authority
to quarantine an exposed person only in rare situations, such
as events at ports of entry or in similar time-sensitive
settings.t"

The authority of state governments to order quarantines varies
widely. In general, state laws provide that a public health agency
can issue a quarantine order in accordance with certain statutory
conditions.s? When a quarantine policy requires individual detention, some states mandate that a court must issue the detention order. 50 Many states use statutes to identify the diseases for which
quarantines may be enforced. 51 Other states delegate the authority
to identify such diseases to a public health agency.v
Regardless of how they are structured, state laws governing
quarantine authority do have one thing in common: they tend to be
very old. Many of the relevant statutes are between forty and one
hundred years 01d. 53 Not surprisingly, the older statutes "often do
not reflect contemporary scientific understandings of disease, [or]
current treatments of choice [.]"54 Indeed, many of these more antiquated state laws were drafted to address particular epidemics of
48. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Questions and Answers on the Executive Order Adding Potentially Pandemic Influenza Viruses to the List of Quarantinable Diseases,
http://www.survivalring.orgtpandemic/index.php?file=Questions%20and%20Answers%20on
%20the%20Executive%200rder%20.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
49. Cole, supra note 11, at 6; Paula Mindes, Note, Tuberculosis Quarantine: A Review of
Legal Issues in Ohio and Other States, 10 J.L. & HEAI:nl 403, 409 (1995).
50. Mindes, supra note 49, at 409.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et aI., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 101-02 (1999); State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NA'r'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.orgtresearch/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
54. Gostin, supra note 53, at 106.
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particular diseases; therefore, they are not well suited to provide
the kind of flexible authority required to respond to a wide range of
diseases threatening to spread from a wide variety of sources. 55
C.

Cases Studies in Quarantine Law

Two recent events illustrate some of the potential problems with
the use of quarantine and isolation authority in the United States.
In both of these cases, government officials sought to control the
activity of a person exposed to a dangerous, contagious disease.
But, in both cases, government officials failed to achieve both their
own objectives and, arguably, the best outcome for the public
health from the perspective of public health policy. These two cases
demonstrate what can go wrong when government officials are
called upon to use their power to control contagious disease, and
they provide an idea of what must be changed so things can go
right.
1. Andrew Speaker and Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis

Physicians diagnosed Andrew Speaker with pulmonary tuberculosis ("TB") in March 2007.56 At first, those physicians thought he
could be treated with standard anti-TB medications. 57 Further testing revealed that Speaker's TB was multi-drug resistant, which
meant there was a risk not only that his treatment could prove difficult, but also that he could infect others and be "patient zero" in a
far wider outbreak.>" In May 2007, county health officials orally
advised Speaker to seek specialized treatment and refrain from
traveling.>?

Speaker was planning a wedding and honeymoon, and he was
disinclined to follow the officials' advice about travel.s? Accordingly, he did the opposite of what they advised, advancing his travel
plans by two days and flying from Atlanta, Georgia, to Paris,
France, on May 12.6 1 While Speaker was doing this, local officials
55. Cole, supra note 11, at 7.
56. Howard Markel et aI., Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: An Isolation Order,
Public Health Powers, and a Global Crisis, J. AM. MEl). ASS'N, July 4, 2007, at 83, 83; John
Schwartz, Tangle of Conflicting Accounts in TB Patient's Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2007,
at 1A; David Brown & Spencer Hsu, Officials Detail Errors in TB Case; Travel Followed
Lack of Cooperation, Late Reaction, Weak Safeguards, WASHINGTON POST, June 7, 2007, at
A6.
57. Markel, et al, supra note 56, at 83.
58. See id.
59.ld.
60. [d.
61. [d.
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unsuccessfully tried to serve him with written notice that travel
would be against medical advice and would risk the health of
others.s- In fact, those officials were still trying to serve him with
that notice in Georgia after he had already arrived in France.s>
During the time Speaker was getting married and honeymooning in
Europe, doctors confirmed that he had drug-resistant TB and informed state and federal public health officials.v"
Speaker went ahead with his wedding and honeymoon plans,
traveling to France, Greece, and then Rome.s> While in Rome, the
CDC, the chief federal public health agency, informed him by
phone that he had drug-resistant TB and instructed him to report to
Italian health authorities.ss The CDC specifically instructed him
not to travel on commercial airlines and to wait for word from U.S.
officials about how he could return home without risking others'
health.s? Speaker utterly ignored those instructions.s- He took
commercial flights to Prague and then to Montreal, Canada.v?
From Montreal, Speaker attempted to drive to the United States."?
While Speaker was disregarding the CDC's instructions, the
CDC placed his name on a health surveillance list, which was circulated to the U.S. Border Patrol."! Despite the CDC's warning, a
U.S. border guard, who had seen Speaker's name on the list, nevertheless allowed Speaker into the United States."> After Speaker returned to the United States, the CDC invoked federal quarantine
law and ordered him to report to Bellevue Hospital in New York
City." First, Speaker was subject to a provisional isolation order
under federal law, which permitted the CDC to detain him in New
York for three days.?" After that, the CDC transported him to Atlanta, where he was detained under a regular isolation order-the
first issued by the federal government since 1963.75 Eventually,
62. [d.

63. Markel, et al., supra note 56, at 83.
64.
65.
66.
67.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

68. /d.
69. Markel, et al., supra note 56, at 83.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

75. Markel, et al., supra note 56, at 83.
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Speaker was transferred under escort by a CDC quarantine officer
to the National Jewish Medical Center in Denver, Colorado, where
he was treated.?"
2. Kaci Hickox and Ebola
Kaci Hickox, a U.S. citizen and a nurse, returned to the United
States in October 2014, after treating Ebola patients for Doctors
Without Borders in Sierra Leone."? According to federal guidelines
promulgated by the CDC, persons at risk for developing Ebola
were advised-but not required-to isolate themselves from others
for twenty-one days.?" The CDC and the Obama Administration
concluded that health care workers returning from West Africa
need not be subject to mandatory quarantine restrictions, although
at the time, the federal government required that U.S. military personnel returning from West Africa be subjected to mandatory quarantine for twenty-one days."?
Many states, including New York and New Jersey, declined to
follow these federal guidelines, preferring stricter controls under
their own law. 80 When Hickox arrived in New Jersey while traveling to her home in Maine, New Jersey officials ordered that she be
quarantined in a tent in a Newark hospital." Hickox resisted the
New Jersey order and was eventually permitted to be privately
transported back to Maine.e- Once in Maine, officials there imposed their own restrictions on Hickox's movements, which included preventing her from using public conveniences, such as
public transportation, movie theatres, and shopping malls.s'
Maine's efforts to enforce those restrictions wound up in federal
district court.v' The chief judge of a state district court, Charles
LaVerdiere, rejected the state's request to enforce the restrictions,
holding "[t]he state has not met its burden at this time to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that limiting [Hickox's] movements
76. Id.
77. Betsy McKay, et aI., CDC Rejects Mandatory Ebola Quarantines, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
27, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/federal-ebola-quarantine-guidelines-releasedby-cdc-1414443143.
78. Id.
79. Warren Richey, Ebola Quarantine: Why Judge Sided with Nurse Kaci Hickox, CHRIS.
TIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014110311
Ebola-quarantine-why-judge-sided-with-nurse-Kaci-Hickox-video.
80. See McKay, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82.Id.
83. Richey, supra note 79.
84. Jd.
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to the degree requested is necessary to protect other individuals
from the dangers of infection[.]"85 The court noted that Hickox
had agreed to twice-daily monitoring by state health officials, and
the court provided that the state's more stringent restrictions could
be imposed to isolate Hickox if her condition changed for the
worse.w Even so, Maine officials insisted that this was not enough
and that Hickox should be subject to stricter restrictions because, in
their judgment, she posed a threat to the health of others-even if
the risk of infection had passed and she hadn't yet manifested any
symptoms of infection."?
3.

Issues Raised

The Speaker and Hickox cases show that there are significant
legal problems with the administrative law regime for ordering
quarantines and isolation to control the spread of communicable
disease. The principal problems pertain to a lack of coordination
between federal and state disease-control policy and to ambiguity
and conflicts within the legal structure for ordering quarantines and
isolation at both the federal and state levels.
The problem with failing to coordinate is primarily evident in
the Hickox case. There, Hickox was caught between dramatically
conflicting approaches to the risks arising from her exposure to
Ebola patients. For its part, the federal government apparently did
not believe her exposure presented a dramatic risk to public health.
Accordingly, the federal government only issued advisory guidelines to Hickox, and those guidelines only imposed modest restrictions on her personal liberty. By contrast, state officials in both
New Jersey and Maine seemed to view her situation with alarm,
seeking to impose much more restrictive controls. Because this
conflict involved only a single individual, it was possible to solve it
through a judicially compelled compromise. If the conflict had involved a significant number of persons in different situations, however, it may have been more difficult, if not impossible, under the
current legal and administrative structure to find a single solution
that addressed all of the dimensions of the public health problem,
but also resolved all of the competing federal and state agency policy prerogatives and interests.
85. Id. (alteration in original).
86.ld.
87.ld.
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In Speaker's case, the most evident problem was the fact that
Speaker evaded any meaningful control by CDC officials when he
traveled throughout Europe, into Canada, and back into the United
States. Speaker's actions greatly exacerbated the risk of spreading
a very dangerous disease that was extraordinarily difficult to treat.
Despite the capacity of the CDC to enlist airlines and other government agencies in the enforcement of a travel ban, the ban proved
ineffective. With respect to Speaker, the problem was not determining the right action to take to control the risk; the problem was
communicating the CDC's decision to the private entities and agencies responsible for effecting that action.
Although they differ in some respects, the Speaker and Hickox
cases have one important thing in common: they both illustrate that
the current legal and administrative structure for defining, issuing,
and enforcing quarantine and isolation orders falters when rapid
execution of policy decisions is required. Because each case involved an individual, the consequences of such faltering were not
significant. But, if a similar problem of execution arose in a more
extensive disease outbreak, the consequences for the public health
could be grave.
III.
A.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

Commentators and policy analysts have long recognized that coordination and a lack of uniform policy making are problems
throughout the entire system of public health administration, not
simply when issuing orders for quarantine and isolation. The cases
discussed above demonstrate as much. One response to those systematic problems is the proposal of model uniform public health
legislation for all states. The leading proposal of such a model law
was the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEHPA"),
which was first drafted in late 2001 in response to the anthrax attacks'" that occurred earlier that year.s? After a period of com88. Because anthrax cannot be spread from person to person, it is not the kind of communicable disease that is typically addressed by quarantine and isolation orders. To the extent
that the MSEHPA was a response to the anthrax attacks, it reflected an awareness that acts
of bioterrorism could cause outbreaks of communicable disease, but not the conclusion that
the anthrax attack could have been one such outbreak.
89. Lawrence O. Gostin, et aI., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning
for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, J. AM. MEl).
Ass'r- Aug., 7, 2002, at 622, 622.
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ment, MSEHPA was slightly revised in 2002, and thirty-eight states
eventually adopted it in some form.??
Like other model acts, MSEHPA was designed to create a uniform system of rules for public agencies, to avoid conflicts of law
among the states, and to simplify the process of designing an administrative law structure in public health matters for individual state
governments.?' It succeeded in many important respects. The
MSEHPA certainly brought the promised uniformity to state law by
standardizing the patchwork of administrative law systems that had
prevailed among the states for nearly a century. The MSEHPA also
had some salutary political effects; it represents a significant response to developing public awareness and concern about the risk
of widespread disease outbreaks, whether caused by natural events
or bioterrorism. Nevertheless, the statute had significant drawbacks, especially when it came to improving the legal structure for
ordering quarantines and isolations to control the spread of communicable disease.
In the event of a public health crisis, the MSEHPA provides for
expansive executive powers. These provisions are triggered when a
state's governor declares a "state of public health emergency."92
The MSEHPA defines a "public health emergency" as "an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition[,]" caused
by a variety of public health threats that pose a substantial risk of a
significant number of human fatalities or incidents of permanent or
long-term disability.?>
Once a state of emergency is declared, the MSEHPA authorizes
state public health officials to take control of all health care facilities in the state, issue orders to physicians, order citizens to submit
to examinations and treatment, and-where necessary-to quarantine or isolate.?" So empowered, public health officials may "require a health care facility to provide services or the use of its
facility if such services or use are reasonable and necessary [for
emergency response,]" and such authorized use "may include transferring the management and supervision of the health care facility
to the public health authority[.]"95 The MSEHPA also grants im90. Markel, et aI., supra note 56, at 84.
91. See Gostin, supra note 89.
92. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEAI;m POWERS Acr § 402 (CTR. FOR LAW & PUB.
HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS. 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.netJ
MSEHPAlMSEHPA2.pdf.
93. Id. § 104(m).
94. Id. § 502.
95. Id.
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munity from liability to all of the officials who exercise these expansive powers.?" Only actions constituting gross negligence or willful
misconduct are excluded from this blanket grant of immunity.??
The MSEHPA provides severe consequences for any person
who does not defer to state officials' exercise of these broad powers.?" In the initial draft of the model legislation, a person who
failed to obey an order to submit to examination or treatment was
guilty of a misdemeanor. 99 The revised draft removed the criminal
sanction but still provided that a person who disobeyed an order for
examination or treatment would be detained in another way-in
quarantine or isolation.t''?
B.

Criticism of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

The MSEHPA is a powerful instrument for addressing widespread public health emergencies, but it is something of a blunderbuss. It is easy to see that it was designed with acts of bioterrorism
in mind. The broad powers created by the MSEHPA-and the draconian consequences for resisting such powers-suggest the drafters were anticipating the application of the law in a situation where
a terrorist group infected a group of persons with a highly communicable disease, such as smallpox, thereby creating the risk of a rapidly spreading pandemic with high rates of mortality.
While the MSEHPA has some advantages in addressing bioterrorist acts that pose an immediate threat to whole populations, it is
not well-adapted to other kinds of public health threats arising from
communicable diseases. As one commentator has noted, "the authority to respond to a bioterrorist attack or a new epidemic that
the model act provides is much too broad, since it applies to not just
real emergencies such as a smallpox attack but also to nonemergency conditions as diverse as annual influenza epidemics and the
AIDS epidemic." 101 In particular, the MSEHPA is not welladapted to the kind of problem presented by the Speaker or Hickox
cases, which principally involve questions about how to treat one
person who has suffered a unique and isolated exposure to a com96. Jd. § 804(a).

97. Jd.
98. MODEL

STATE EMERGENCY HEAI:rH POWERS

Acr § 604.

99. Jd.

100. George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health & Civil Liberties, 346
1337, 1341 (2002).
101. /d.

MED.

NEW ENG.

J.
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municable disease and to assure the individual's exposure does not
create a risk for others.
For example, the MSEHPA does not provide specific authority
for state public health officials who need to respond to something
less than a full-blown state of emergency. The extraordinary powers created by the model act are binary. That is, they are either
"on" in the event of a widespread crisis, or they are "Off."102 There
is no significant provision for scaling specific powers to fit the particular problem.
In addition, even when there is a widespread public health
emergency, it may not always make sense to put public health officials in charge of the response.t'" As one commentator has pointed
out:
[Tjhe tasks of identifying affected persons, reporting them,
treating them, and taking preventive actions will be performed by physicians, nurses, emergency medical personnel,
and hospitals. The primary role of public health authorities
will usually be, as it was in the wake of the anthrax attacks,
to provide guidance to the public and other government officials in identifying and dealing with the disease and to provide laboratory facilities where exposure can be evaluated
and diagnoses definitively established.l'"

Here again, the MSEHPA does not provide for much middle
ground. It seems to anticipate that public health powers to control
communicable diseases will only be needed in situations where officials will control all medical decisions and also that physicians, hospital administrators, and other private actors will merely serve as
agents who execute the officials' plan. The MSEHPA does not
leave much room for collaboration between public health officials
and decision-makers about the treatment of communicable disease.
Along the same lines, the model act seems to expect doctors,
nurses, and other health care professionals will need to be forcibly
coerced into following the policy prescriptions of state public health
officials. Given the MSEHPAs provisions for taking patients' liberty if they do not follow orders, the same assumption is made for
patients and those who are not yet sure whether they have been
infected. But recent experiences with threatened outbreaks of disease suggest that resistance to examination and treatment will not
102. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEAI;("H POWERS ACT § 401 (providing for extraordinary powers only in the event of an officially declared state of emergency).
103. Annas, supra note 100, at 1341-42.
104. Id.
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be the only problem that officials and treatment providers face. To
be sure, some persons will resist, but others will clamor for examination, testing, and treatment-even if there is no particular reason
to think they will need it. lOS
With respect to quarantine powers, the MSEHPA misses the
mark because it operates on the premise that there will likely be a
need to detain large numbers of people in quarantine, regardless of
the form the public health crisis takes. But,
there is no empirical evidence that draconian provisions for
quarantine, such as those outlined in the model act, are necessary or desirable. Persons with smallpox, for example, are
most infectious only after fever and a rash have developed, and then they are usually so sick that they are likely to
accept whatever care is available. Moreover ... the long
incubation period (10-17 days) almost ensures that some
persons who are infected in the [smallpox] attack will have
traveled great distances from the site of the exposure before
the disease is recognized or quarantine could be implemented. The key to an effective public health response is
identifying and helping those who have been exposed. Even
with a sufficient supply of smallpox vaccine, a quarantine enforced by the police would probably not be effective in controlling an outbreak of smallpox. 106

The model act's quarantine powers are problematic in another
way, one that implicates constitutional considerations. In the original version of the MSEHPA, and even in its revised draft, the provisions covering quarantine lend themselves to arbitrary action by
state officials. According to the original version, officials can order
a quarantine if they are "uncertain regarding whether [a person refusing to undergo medical examination or testing] has been exposed
to or is infected with a contagious or possibly contagious disease or
otherwise poses a danger to public health."107 Unfortunately, the
revised draft makes this problem worse. It provides that quarantine
can be ordered when the person's refusal to be examined or tested
"results in uncertainty regarding whether he or she has been exposed to or is infected with a contagious or possibly contagious disease or otherwise poses a danger to public health. "108 As a
commentator pointed out, "[t]his is no standard at all; it simply permits public health authorities to quarantine anyone who refuses to
105. Annas, supra note 100, at 1342.
106. [d. (alteration in original) (footnotes, citations, and internal quotations omitted).
107. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
108. Annas, supra note 100, at 1339-40.
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be examined or treated, for whatever reason, since all refusals will
result in uncertainty."109
When acting pursuant to such a statute without delineated standards, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for officials to avoid the
appearance that they are acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. This appearance could be enough to give rise to an arbitrary
exercise of power that could imperil the exercise of any authority
pursuant to the model act. As noted in Part I, the judiciary has
been broadly deferential to the decision-making and actions of public health officials dealing with emerging threats to public health,
overruling the decisions only when they seem to flagrantly depart
from the standard of good faith.'!" But when a statute provides, in
effect, that a person can be deprived of liberty and placed in quarantine just because he or she refused to submit to an examination
or test, it makes the officials who are acting under that statute seem
as though they are acting without sound reason. Even worse, it provides an opportunity for bad-minded officials to abuse their discretionary authority because it not only provides essentially
unbounded authority, but also immunizes officials from liability if
they choose to abuse that authority.
The final significant problem with the MSEHPA is that it provides opportunities for state officials to make important policy decisions that should be entirely within the discretionary authority of
federal officials at the CDC or the PHS. In general, state officials
have shown an impulse to defer to federal officials when there is
even a suggestion that a public health problem may involve an act
of bioterrorism.t ' ! But this is no guarantee that state officials will
continue to defer and will not usurp policy prerogatives that should
belong primarily to the federal government.v'? Indeed, there was
an indication of this problem in the Hickox case when state officials
in Maine and New Jersey sought to impose a more stringent policy
to control Ebola than the federal government thought was
advisable.v'>

109. ld.
110. See, e.g., Miller v. Campbell Cty., 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).

111. Annas, supra note 100, at 1339-40.
112. ld.
113. Richey, supra note 79.
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C. An Alternative Proposal for Reform
Aside from the several problems with the MSEHPA, there is
another way that the model act fails to solve a critical problem with
quarantine law-the problem of a lack of policy coordination between public health officials at different levels of government. As
previously noted, this is a problem because it creates an opportunity for states to trespass in a policymaking province that should
belong exclusively to the federal government. But this is not just a
problem of federalism, it is also a problem of coherent government
action. Regardless of whether a public health problem implicates
considerations of national security, it should be met with a coherent
policy program if it involves any risk of interstate transmission. The
current legal and administrative structure for dealing with public
health problems does not ensure such a coordinated response.
But there is a change that could solve this problem: give the
PHS and its designees, especially the CDC, exclusive primary jurisdiction over any public health problem involving one of the diseases
identified by a federal executive order. In addition, the government
should empower these federal agencies to delegate administrative
authority to state and local public health agencies to the extent that
the federal agencies conclude is necessary.
This kind of jurisdictional structure would solve the two main
problems arising from the Speaker and Hickox cases. First, such a
structure would assure that basic policy decisions regarding how to
address disease outbreaks were made by a single decision-maker
who would be concerned with national consequences above all else.
This would avoid the problems of policy coordination that were so
evident in the Hickox case. Second, a delegation of authority to
state officials and their agencies would effectively deputize a wide
range of government officials to execute orders designed for the
protection of the public. With a greater number of officials at all
levels of government in position to carry out orders issued at the
federal level, it will be much harder for an individual like Speaker
to slip through the cracks and evade regulations and advisories necessary for the public health.
This proposed reform would not make state public health agencies mere adjuncts of the PHS and CDC. These agencies still would
retain full independent authority to control all public health
problems that do not involve one of the diseases over which the
federal government has primary and exclusive jurisdiction. And,
they could be authorized to act independently if the PHS or the
CDC decided to abjure control over a particular disease outbreak.
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Giving federal agencies primary jurisdiction only assures problems
of national scope will be addressed by action directed from a single
federal source.

